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Introduction 
This paper provides background infor­
mation about why economists advocate 
limited entry as amethod offishery man­
agement. Its purpose is to give a general 
overview ofthe rationale for limited en­
try rather than a detailed account of ex­
isting programs. Townsend (1990) pro­
vides a review of existing limited-entry 
programs. 
There are many criteria and objectives 
by which alternative methods of fishery 
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ABSTRACT-Thispapergives an overview 
ofthe economic rationalefor limited entry as 
a methodoffishery managementanddiscusses 
general advantages and disadvantages of 
license limitation and catch rights as the two 
primary methods of restricting access to 
marine fisheries. Traditional open-access 
methodsofregulation (e. g. , gear restrictions, 
size limits, trip limits, quotas, and closures) 
can be temporarily effective inprotectingfish 
populations, but they generallyfail toprovide 
lasting biological or economic benefits to 
fishermen because theydo not restrict access 
to thefishery. The general result ofregulation 
with unrestricted access to afishery is addi­
tional and more costly and complex regula­
tions as competition increasesfor dwindling 
fishery resources. Regulation that restricts ac­
cess to afishery in conjunction with selected 
traditional methods ofregulation would en­
courage efficient resource usageandminimize 
the need for future regulatory adjustments, 
provided that enforcement and monitoring 
costs are nottoo great. In theory, catch rights 
are superior to license limitation as a means 
ofrestricting access to a fishery. 
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management can be judged. For exam­
ple, biologists are interested in the main­
tenance of adequate recruitment or im­
provement in recruitment, population 
age structure, and genetic diversity. 
Economists are interested in the long­
term achievement of these goals in an 
economically efficient manner. Econom­
ic efficiency is loosely defined here as 
society's ability to maximize the com­
bined value ofcommercial, recreational, 
and aesthetic products and services that 
can be obtained for a given level ofcost, 
or the achievement of a given level of 
products and services at minimum cost. 
Economists advocate limited entry as a 
method of fishery management because 
economic efficiency is not likely to be 
achieved in an open-access fishery. 
This paper is presented in five sections. 
The first section describes how unre­
stricted access to a fishery leads to inef­
ficiency and overfishing. Unharvested 
fish are common property, which even­
tually creates a situation in which there 
are too many fishermen in the fishery, 
each applying too much effort. Excess 
capital and labor could be used elsewhere 
in a more cost effective manner and the 
same quantity offish could be produced 
at lower overall cost. 
The second section describes how 
open-access methods of regulation lead 
to further inefficiencies. Restrictions or 
prohibitions on the use of certain types 
of fishing gear, quotas, size limits, trip 
limits, and seasonal and area closures can 
achieve short-term biological improve­
ments, but only by forcing fishermen to 
use more costly or less productive 
methods of fishing. The third section 
describes why, in the long term, unre­
stricted access tends to compromise the 
biological objectives of regulation. The 
potential long-term benefits of open-
access regulations tend to disappear due 
to uncontrolled increases in fishing ef­
fort, all regulated to use economically 
inefficient methods of fishing. See 
Anderson (1986), Bell (1978), Crutch­
field (1973), Crutchfield and Pontecorvo 
(1969), Crutchfield and Zellner (1963), 
Gordon (1954), Keen (1988), and Scott 
(1979) for further discussion. 
Methods of limiting entry attempt to 
minimize the need to implement regula­
tions that impose further economic inef­
ficiencies. The fourth section summar­
izes some advantages and disadvantages 
oflicense limitation and catch rights as the 
two primary methods of restricting ac­
cess to a fishery. Catch rights have better 
potential to improve long-term biological 
and economic benefits, provided that en­
forcement and monitoring costs are not 
too great. Section five summarizes the 
paper and discusses why managers of 
marine fisheries in the United States seem 
to prefer open-access regulations. 
Limited entry is generally considered to 
apply to commercial fisheries. This paper 
follows that supposition; however, sec­
tion five speculates about the possibilities 
of applying limited-entry methods of 






Marine fisheries represent a modern 
version of Hardin's (1968) "tragedy of 
freedom in a commons" in which fisher­
men, each acting in his or her own self 
interest, are compelled to overfish and 
deplete the resources upon which they 
depend. Fish are said to be common prop­
erty because no individual owns the ocean 
or the fish in it. Hence, fish may be har­
vested on a first-come-first-served basis 
by anyone with appropriate gear, subject 
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to eXisting regulations established by 
state and Federal governments as trustees 
of the public's resources. This creates a 
situation in which what is optimal for the 
individual fisherman is not always op­
timal for all fishermen combined. 
The number of fishermen in a fishery 
tends toward an equilibrium in which the 
net revenues (after accounting for fixed 
and variable costs) earned by an addi­
tional fisherman just equal his opportun­
ity cost, defined as the net income that 
could be earned in another fishery or 
another occupation I. Fishermen will 
enter a fishery ifthey expecttoearnmore 
than they could elsewhere; conversely, 
they will leave a fishery if they cannot 
earn as much as they could elsewhere. 
However, when a fisherman expands his 
effort or a new fisherman enters the fish­
ery, he imposes what are called indirect 
or external costs on everyone else. These 
external costs represent the value ofthe 
additional overfishing created by his 
extra fishing effort and correspond to the 
negative componentofutility inHardin's 
(1968) example about overgrazing. 
There are several types of external 
costs in a fishery. Crowding externalities 
reduce catch rates during the current 
harvesting season by distributing the 
available catch among a greater number 
ofparticipants. Stockexternalities reduce 
future catch rates by reducing the size of 
next year's fish population via reductions 
in fish survival and spawning potential. 
A crowding externality occurs because 
fishermen harvest from a common pool 
offish. Therefore, every new entrant into 
a fishery would capture some fish that 
would have been caught by his com­
petitors (Bell, 1978; Cheung, 1970). 
Each fisherman may seem to have little 
or no effect on the catch rates ofhis com­
petitors, but when fishermen simulta­
neously expand their fishing effort, the 
result is lower catch rates for all. In other 
words, the addition of fishing effort 
causes the fishery pie to be divided into 
smaller pieces. The commercial trap 
fishery for spiny lobsters in Monroe 
I For example, consider Ihe person who earns 
$30,000 per year as a hired captain on a company­
owned fishing vessel. His next best employment 
alternative might pay only $20,000. Thatis, hisop­
portunity cost is $20,000. Ifhe were permanently 
unemployable elsewhere, then his opportunity cost 
would be $0. 
County, Fla., is a good example. The 
number of traps fished has tripled since 
the early 1970's while total harvest has 
fluctuated without trend. 
A stock externality occurs because 
common property subverts the incentives 
to save fish for future harvest. By post­
poning the harvest of some fish, fisher­
men could invest in future fish supplies 
and future commercial income or rec­
reational enjoyment. But few fishermen 
would voluntarily alter their harvesting 
techniques or strategies to conserve fish 
for the future because there is no assur­
ance that the fish they save would not be 
caught, either now or in the future, by 
competing fishermen (Scott, 1955; 
Christy, 1978). Once again, each fisher­
man may have no noticeable effect on the 
sizeofthe nextyear's fish population, but 
the simultaneous expansion of effort by 
all fishermen results in smaller popula­
tions of fish available for capture in the 
future. Fish like the deep-water groupers 
probably have significant stock exter­
nalities because they are relatively long 
lived, slowgrowing, and easily depleted. 
The magnitude ofexternal costs varies 
with the overall exploitation rate. When 
exploitation rates are low, expansion of 
fishing effort may have a negligible ad­
verse effect on current and future catch 
rates. Overfishing may not occuror may 
not be severe. However, when exploita­
tion rates are high, expansion of effort 
may have a considerable effect on current 
and future catch rates. The problem is that 
each fisherman receives the entire benefit 
ofemploying his additional fishing effort, 
but the additional, indirect effects of 
overfishing are dispersed amongall fish­
ermen. Although external costs are real, 
they occur mainly at the expense ofother 
fishermen so that the individual has little 
incentive to curtail or alter his harvesting 
practices to avoid them. Hence, fisher­
men do not account for external costs in 
their decisions to enter or leave a fishery 
or to expand their scales ofoperation. The 
result is too many fishermen, each fishing 
too intensively2. 
2 Other factors, such as government loan programs 
and tax law, may exacerbate the problem of over­
capitalization in the fishery, but the tendency to over­
fish in the open-access (common property) fishery 
would remain even if those other factors did not 
exist. 
The net addition to the value ofoutput 
after accounting for external costs is less 
than the costs of employing the extra 
effort (Anderson, 1986; Cheung, 1970; 
Gordon, 1954), which implies that the 
resources used to produce excess effort 
would be more cost effectively employed 
in other fisheries or other sectors ofthe 
economy. Theexistenceofsignificantex­
ternal costs reflects what economists call 
"market failure" in which the normal 
competitive forces which affect the deci­
sions ofindividual fishermen do not result 
in an optimal overall harvest from the 
perspective of society as a whole. 
Although certain resources, such as 
some marine fishes, are scarce, they have 
remained common property because the 
costs ofdefining and enforcing a claim of 
ownership are higher than the expected 
benefits3 (Cheung, 1970; Demsetz, 
1967). Therefore, public regulation of 
marine fisheries appears necessary to 
overcome the incentives to overfish and 
its consequences. Limited entry attempts 
to overcome the problem ofexternal costs 
and its built-in incentives to overfish 
through the creation and enforcement of 
property rights where they have not 
evolved naturally. More correctly, 
limited-entry systems ofmanagement in­
troduce elements ofproperty rights into 
a fishery through the issuance of what 
may be called fishing use rights, fishing 
privileges, or the right of access to the 
fishery. Limited entry does not assign 
ownership of the ocean or the fish in it. 
Open-access Regulations 
Create Economic Inefficiencies 
Traditional, open-access methods of 
managing a fishery attempt to reduce 
fishing mortality either directly (with 
gear restrictions or prohibitions) or in­
directly (by restricting the allowable 
catches through the use of quotas, trip 
limits, size limits, and seasonal and area 
closures). These methods can work bio­
logically, at least in the short term, but 
they create economic inefficiencies by 
forcing fishermen to adopt less produc­
3 The benefits ofprivate property rights depend on 
the ability to exclude others from using a resource 
if they are not willing to pay for its use. If it is too 
costly to exclude nonpayers, then common property 
prevails and fishermen are compelled to harvestas 
quickly as possible to keep upwith theircompetitors . 
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tive, and hence less profitable, harvesting 
techniques and/or to incur higher costs to 
comply with or react to the regulations. 
Some economic consequences oftradi­
tional regulatory techniques are briefly 
summarized below. Anderson (\986), 
Bell (1978), Christy (1978), Crutchfield 
and Pontecorvo (1969), and Crutchfield 
and Zellner (1963) provide more com­
plete discussions. 
Gear restrictions and prohibitions tend 
to induce economic inefficiency by forc­
ing fishermen to use more expensive 
and/or less productive fishing tech­
niques. Fishermen could switch to other 
gear types, but presumably these 
fishermen were already using their most 
profitable gears, so the switch would 
reduce profits. Also, fishermen could in­
crease their usage of uncontrolled com­
ponents of effort. For example, if the 
number of lobster traps per boat were 
restricted, fishermen might reduce soak 
times, adopt faster trap pullers, or experi­
ment with new trap designs or different 
baiting techniques. Or, fishermen could 
invent a new gear or fishing technique. 
Even if fishing mortality were initially 
reduced by gear restrictions and prohibi­
tions, it would not necessarily be main­
tained at a reduced level because with 
open access there could be a long-term in­
crease in the number of fishermen each 
using the restricted gear. 
Annual quotas and the resultant sea­
sonal closures encourage fishermen to 
seek more effective ways to maximize 
their shares ofthe overall catch before the 
quota is reached and the season is closed. 
Fishermen would fish more intensively 
earlier in the season and would actively 
seek out and adopt new gear, larger ves­
sels, or different technologies designed 
to increase catches before the fishery is 
closed. Yet, catches per fisherman do not 
necessarily increase due to crowding and 
stock externalities and the overall limit on 
production. Hence, quotas and seasonal 
closures increase harvesting costs, 
reduce the length of the fishing season, 
and may reduce dockside prices because 
the entire industry's catch is landed dur­
ing a shorter period of time. Also, a 
shorter fishing season could lead to an 
overall reduction in product quality iffish 
are not properly stored when boats are at 
sea during the race for fish, if a larger 
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fraction of the overall catch must be 
frozen rather than sold in fresh markets, 
and if fish must be frozen for longer 
periods oftime before they are marketed. 
One reviewer questioned why gear 
restrictions/prohibitions and annual 
quotas are identified as creating addi­
tional inefficiencies ifthey spur innova­
tion. Actually, there is nothing wrong 
with innovation per se. The inefficiencies 
arise when fishermen are compelled to 
adopt innovations which lead to pre­
mature capital replacement and over­
investment in fishing power for the ex­
pected harvest rate. The total commercial 
harvest will not be taken with minimum 
cost. In addition, more fishing power ap­
plied to an already stressed fish popula­
tion would simply hasten the next round 
ofregulations designed to restrict or pro­
hibit the new technology. 
Minimum size limits, another com­
monly used regulation, tend to reduce 
catch rates or increase harvesting costs in 
several ways. Normalcommercialoper­
ations often preclude fishermen from 
promptly returning undersized fish to the 
water, which would tend to reduce the 
likelihood that fish survive when re­
leased, especially in deeper water. These 
fish are wasted because they do not con­
tribute to current or future catches or to 
an enhanced fish population. Even iffish 
survive when released, fishermen incur 
extra costs to cull them from the rest of 
the catch. Fishermen may minimize their 
catches ofundersized fish by using larger 
hooks or net mesh openings and by 
avoiding fishing grounds known to have 
large concentrations of small fish, but 
they would incur extra gear and fuel costs 
to do so. Some fishermen could use 
undersized fish for bait, thereby saving 
bait costs as well as extra gear and fuel 
costs, but this practice would deny the 
potential future benefits ofthe size limit. 
In addition, because size limits do not 
restrict access to a fishery, they would not 
prevent potential long-term increases in 
fishing effort, which would increase the 
proportion of fish harvested as soon as 
they reached the minimum legal size, 
with the ironic consequence that relative­
ly few fish would survive to exceptionally 
large or trophy sizes. 
Other open-access methods ofregula­
tion also increase fishermen's costs of 
harvesting a given quantity of fish. For 
example, seasonally closed fishing areas 
or permanently closed marine sanctu­
aries (Davis, 1989; Plan Development 
Team, 1990; Tisdell and Broadus, 1989) 
would eliminate current and future 
catches from the closed areas, and fish­
ermen would incur increased travel costs 
to legal fishing grounds. Trip limits 
would force fishermen to make shorter 
but more frequent fishing trips, which 
would increase fuel costs and the amount 
of nonfishing time spent traveling from 





Increases in Fishing Effort
 
Although open-access methods of 
management can reduce harvest levels 
and may initially reduce fishing effort, 
none ofthem can control potential long­
term increases in fishing effort. Commer­
cial and recreational fishing effort is 
presumed capable of increasing over 
time. In the commercial sector, fishing 
effort is not fixed; capital and labor are 
observed to enter and leave the fishery for 
a variety ofreasons, including changes in 
fishery regulations and changes in the 
profitability of participating in a partic­
ular fishery compared to alternative 
fisheries. While these factors could cause 
fishing effort to either increase or 
decrease, effort is expected to increase 
over time due to long-term increases in 
the population ofconsumers ofcommer­
cial fishery products and cost-saving 
technological change. The demand for 
commercial fishery products will prob­
ably increase over time as the population 
ofconsumers and their incomes increase. 
In addition, cost-saving technological 
change enhances the profitability of 
fishing, which would attract more effort 
into the fishery. In the recreational sec­
tor, marine fishing activities have in­
creased and probably will continue to 
increase due to increases in coastal pop­
ulations, per capita income, tourism in 
coastal regions, and improvements to 
highways that facilitate travel to coastal 
areas. 
Ifregulations such as gear restrictions, 
quotas, minimum size limits, trip limits, 
and closures were successful in enhanc­
ing stock biomass and, therefore, catch 
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rates and profits (for commercial fisher­
men) or utility (for recreational fisher­
men), fishing effort would be expected to 
increase. This increased effort would 
tend tocompromise short-term biological 
gains that had been achieved, and even­
tually would require additional regula­
tions to further control fishing mortality. 
Increased effort would also cause catch 
per unit of effort to decline due to the 
crowding and stock externalities de­
scribed earlier. This leads to the phenom­
enon known as dissipation of fishery 
rent4 in which potential long-term eco­
nomic benefits of regulation tend to dis­
appear as more effort enters the fishery. 
However, fishermen do not enter or leave 
a fishery at exactly the same time because 
their opportunity costs (i. e. , potential in­
comes in alternative fisheries or land­
based employment) are not the same for 
themselves or for their investments in 
boats and gear, and because their expec­
tations differ about the future profitability 
of the fishery. Therefore, the potential 
benefits of regulation would be mini­
mized but not completely eliminated 
(Anderson, 1985). 
If traditional regulations proved inef­
fective and fish stocks became depleted 
and catch rates declined, fishermen could 
leave the fishery in search ofmore profit­
able fisheries or other employment. On 
the other hand, fishermen could maintain 
or even increase their levels ofparticipa­
tion in a fishery ifincreases in demand and 
cost-saving technological change kept 
financial returns at acceptable levels 
despite a declining fish population (Bell, 
1978; Christy, 1978). For example, ex­
vessel prices for red snappers in the multi­
species reeffishery ofthe GulfofMexico 
have increased over time due, in part, to 
an increased demand by consumers, a 
deteriorating domestic red snapper popu­
lation, and loss of fishing privileges in 
4 Fishery rent refers to the overall sum for all fisher­
men ofprofits, including a return to capital , above 
opportunity costs for labor. Over time, the existence 
ofprofits above opportunity costs would attract new 
effort into the fishery unless the capital costs ofentry 
were prohibitively high. If relatively large amounts 
ofeffort entered the fishery whenever fishery rent 
existed, then the resulting external costs would wipe 
out most or all ofthe difference between profits and 
opportunity cost.lf relatively small amounts ofef­
fort entered the fishery. then some fishery rent would 
remain and would accrue to fishermen as additional 
profit. 
foreign waters. In addition, fishermen 
have received higher prices for groupers 
and other (than red) snappers as consum­
ers increased their demand for substitute 
species in response to higher red snapper 
prices. Thus, fishing has remained profit­
able although red snappers represent a 
declining share ofthe overall catch ofreef 
fish. 
The usual result ofregulation with un­
restricted access to a fishery is more and 
increasingly restrictive regulations as 
competition increases for dwindling fish­
ery resources. Each regulatory adjust­
ment offers temporary relief to the fish 
population, but over time additional ef­
fort likely will create the need for still 
more gear restrictions and prohibitions, 
stricter quotas, more seasonal and area 
closures, and stricter size and trip limits. 
If political considerations diminish the 
effectiveness ofopen-access regulations 
to achieve even short-term biological 
goals, then the need for additional regula­
tion arises more quickly. Fishermen tend 
to perceive the continued introduction of 
new, more restrictive, costly, and com­
plex regulations as a source ofinstability 
in the fishery and to see the management 
agency as part of or the source of the 
problems. The likely outcomes oftradi­
tional methods ofmanagement are higher 
fishing costs, less productive fishermen, 
additional regulations to control fishing 
effort in the long term, and an adversarial 




Access to a Fishery
 
Regulations that restrict access to a fish­
ery are classified as limited-entry methods 
of management. They attempt to over­
come the fundamental economic incen­
tives to overfish by establishing new sys­
tems offishing rights orprivileges in terms 
ofa limited right ofaccess ora limited right 
to take specific quantities of fish. 
This paper focuses on the two most 
common forms oflimited entry: License 
limitation and catch rights. Various exist­
ing programs that use license limitation 
or catch rights are discussed in Clark et 
al. (1988), GeenandNayar(1988), Hup­
5 I thank Dean Ahrenholz and John Gauvin for point­
ing this out to me. 
pert (1987), Mollett (1986), Pearse 
(1979), Rettig and Ginter (1978), Rettig 
(1984) and Townsend (1990). Otherless 
frequently mentioned alternatives include 
territorial use rights (Christy, 1982; 
Smith and Panayotou, 1984) and sole 
ownership (Keen, 1988; Scott, 1955). 
Licenses represent the right to participate 
in the fishery at any level of activity. 
Catch rights (also called individual trans­
ferable quotas, ITQ's, or individual fish­
ermen's quotas, IFQ's) represent the 
right to land specific quantities of fish. 
Territorial use rights represent the ex­
clusive rightto harvest from agiven area, 
and have been commonly associated with 
relatively sedentary species; private oys­
ter leases are a good example. Sole own­
ership in large bodies ofwater appears to 
be ofinterest primarily as the theoretical 
standard with which the various institu­
tional arrangements for harvesting 
fishery resources are compared. Keen 
(1988), however, recently advocated sole 
ownership as a management tool. 
License Limitation 
License limitation is a management 
system in which the right to deploy some 
basic unit ofeffort, usually the vessel, is 
restricted to those with licenses, and the 
number oflicenses is limited by the regu­
lating agency6. License limitation 
6 Minimum income requirements, which reserve the 
commercial allocation ofa fish stock for those who 
derive at least x%oftheir earned income from com­
mercial fishing, possess some attributes of the 
license limitation method of restricting access to a 
fishery in that individuals must qualify to participate 
in the fishery and that catch per individual would 
be unrestricted until the commercial quota had been 
achieved. However, minimum income require­
ments differ from license limitation in that I) indi­
viduals must qualify each year rather than only at 
the beginning of a limited-entry program, 2) there 
would not be a limit on the total number of poten­
tial qualifiers, and 3) qualifiers could not sell or rent 
their fishing privileges to potentially more profitable 
individuals. It is transferability of fishing privileges 
that enables a given quantity to be harvested at 
minimum cost. Hence, from an economic efficiency 
perspective, minimum income requirements may 
or may not result in the lowest possible costs ofpro­
ducing a given quantity offish. Also, items I) and 
2) imply that minimum income requirements would 
not restrict the potential long-term growth in fishing 
effort by persons who may qualify as full-time com­
mercial fishermen or the long-term growth in effort 
by recreational fishermen (for whom minimum in­
come requirements do not apply). The primary ef­
fect ofminimum income requirements is to protect 
the competitive position of full-time commercial 
fishermen by preventing part-time commercial and 
recreational fishermen from selling their catches. 
Marine Fisheries Review 4 
was the first method used to restrict ac­
cess to a fishery, probably because the 
concept of a license was familiar to fish­
ery managers and fishermen, because 
most limited-entry programs began with 
an agreement that there were or would 
soon be too many fishermen, and because 
the license system was relatively easy to 
administer and enforce (Rettig, 1984). 
The following discussion summarizes 
more detailed descriptions found in Bed­
dington and Rettig (1984), Crutchfield 
(1979), Huppert (1987), Pearse (1980), 
Rettig (1984), Townsend (1990), and 
Wilen (1988). 
Economic Effects 
License limitation is an attempt to fix 
fishing mortality by limiting the number 
ofvessels in the fishery. In theory, poten­
tially large conservation benefits are 
possible when fishing mortality can be 
fixed, usually at a reduced level when 
compared to the status quo. Another ad­
vantage of a fixed fishing mortality is 
that fishery managers would not have 
to predict changes in stock abundance. 
Catches would increase automatically 
when the size of the fish population is 
above average and would decrease auto­
matically when the fish population is 
below average. In addition, license limi­
tation would offer a means of inducing 
compliance with other regulations in the 
fishery because illegal behavior could 
result in loss of license. 
In practice, fishing mortality and fish­
ing effort are seldom equivalent. Effort 
is produced by a variety of factors such 
as vessel size, engine type and horse­
power, the number and type ofgear, the 
number ofcrew, and fishing time. Limi­
tations on the number of vessels would 
encourage fishermen to increase their 
fishing power through improvements in 
other, unrestricted components ofeffort 
(Rettig, 1984). This phenomenon has 
been called "capital stuffing." For ex­
ample, new, larger vessels could replace 
old, smaller vessels. And all vessels could 
add more sophisticated fish finders, more 
and newer gear, larger crews, more 
and/or longer trips. Although most 
license limitation programs restrict other 
components ofeffort, such as vessel ton­
nage, as well as the number ofvessels, it 
is impossible to control all aspects of 
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fishing effort, even iffishing technology 
appears to be fairly inflexible. The effect 
of license limitation would be similar to 
that for gear restrictions in that those with 
licenses would increase their use of un­
restricted components ofeffort. The two 
management systems differ in that there 
could be no net increase in the number of 
operating units with license limitation. 
Licenses acquire value by excluding 
nonlicense holders from participating in 
the fishery. Licenses acquire a value ap­
proximately equal to the expected pro­
fitability of adding another vessel to the 
fishery. If licenses expired and were 
reissued every year, then the license 
value would represent the expected pro­
fits for the current fishing year. IfIicenses 
never expired, then the license value 
would reflect the net present value of 
expected current and future profits. 
Licenses issued in perpetuity would be 
preferred as a means ofensuring a stable 
economic environment for employment 
and investment. 
License values represent the creation 
ofwealth. This wealth is derived from the 
fishery rent that would normally have 
been dissipated via the external costs 
created by extra fishing effort that would 
have been expended in an open-access 
fishery. Fishermen would receive a 
windfall of new wealth if licenses were 
distributed initially by random drawing 
(lottery) or given away according to a 
criterion usually based on some measure 
ofhistorical participation and investment 
in the fishery7 . Theory and experience 
suggest that even with a moratorium to 
prevent entry into the fishery during the 
planning phase, fishing effort would in­
crease as existing fishermen compete to 
qualify for licenses. The increase in 
fishing effort would be more pronounced 
without a moratorium as new entrants 
7 In theory, licenses could also be distributed by 
auction but the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and 
Management Act does not allow permits or licenses 
to be issued for amounts in excess of the adminis­
trative cost of issuing the Iicenses. The government 
would receive the wealth generated through the ini­
tial distribution oflicenses if they were auctioned. 
Newly created wealth could be shared by fishermen 
and the government if annual fees were established 
as a means offinancing the costs of research, admin­
istration, and enforcement offishery management 
plans, and the purchase and retirement (buy-back) 
of licenses as a means of reducing participation in 
the fishery. 
scramble to qualify for licenses and 
wealth. Once licenses have been distrib­
uted, fishermen would gain or lose wealth 
over time as the value of their licenses 
fluctuated due to changes in the factors 
(e.g., prices, costs, catch rates, and in­
terest rates) that determine current and 
expected future profits in the fishery. The 
creation of new wealth makes it impera­
tive that fishery managers and fishermen 
cooperate during the formulation ofthe 
licensing system. 
The transferability of licenses is a 
desirable characteristic. Transferability 
facilitates the development ofamarket in 
which licenses are traded or leased8. An 
organized market for licenses would 
allow new fishermen to enter the fishery. 
License limitation would not bar new 
entrants, but they would have to buy a 
license and someone else would have to 
leave the fishery. The market for licenses 
would encourage the least profitable 
fishermen to leave the fishery ifoffers for 
their licenses were greater than what they 
expected to earn in the fishery, but at least 
they would be paid to leave. 
The existence of a market value for 
licenses implies thatthose who fish would 
incur an additional fixed cost equal to the 
value of the license. If the license were 
leased, then there would be a (cash) rental 
fee. If the license were owned by the 
fisherman, then there would be an oppor­
tunity cost in that the fisherman could 
retire and rent or sell the license to 
another. In essence, the fisherman would 
have to pay himself for the use of the 
license. This opportunity cost would pre­
vent license holders from becoming com­
placent and inefficient because if they 
were, they would be able to earn more by 
selling or renting the license to others. 
Competition in the market for licenses 
8 Licenses would be valuable in terms oftheirabiliry 
to generate profits even if they were not officially 
transferable. If licenses were assigned to fishing 
vessels (to prevent nonfishermen from owning 
licenses), then license value would be incorporated 
into the price of the vessel so that the purchase of 
the right to fish would require the additional pur­
chase ofa particular vessel. lflicenses were assigned 
to individuals rather than to vessels, then fishermen 
who would have sold their licenses were they 
transferable wou Id be expected to enter into off-the­
record partnerships with other potentially more pro­
fitable fishermen. License holders would be reluc­
tant to retire from the fishery because their income 
from the license would simply vanish. 
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ensures that those most willing or able to 
buy or lease licenses, usually the most ef­
ficient and profitable fishermen, would 
acquire or lease them, whatever the initial 
distribution. 
Also, the market for licenses would 
enable the government to reduce fishing 
effort by buying and retiring licenses. 
However, buy-back schemes generally 
have been found to be expensive9 . 
Usually, a large number oflicenses must 
be purchased to reduce the overall catch 
by enough to rebuild depleted fish stocks. 
Other Considerations 
License limitation programs suffer 
from shortcomings in addition to the 
problem of capital stuffing. For one 
thing, if the market price oflicenses were 
determined by fishermen who work full 
time in the restricted fishery, then license 
limitation would tend to exclude fish­
ermen who participate in other fisheries 
at one time or another during the year. 
The problem is that those who wish to 
participate in a restricted fishery on a 
limited basis may not earn enough in it to 
justify the purchase of a license. 
Other details would have to be ad­
dressed before an acceptable and work­
able licensing system could be estab­
lished. For example, would the use and 
transfer of licenses be restricted within 
particular vessel size classes, gear types, 
seasons, or geographical areas to main­
tain historical patterns ofparticipation by 
various interest groups or to reduce the 
number ofcompetitors within each group 
(seeWilen, 1988; Dupont, 1990)?Would 
ownership of licenses be restricted to 
fishermen, or could nonfishermen such 
as dealers, processors, recreational fish­
ing clubs, nonfishing corporations, and 
environmental groups own licenses? 
Could license limitation be enforced if 
licenses were not required in state waters? 
Catch Rights 
Catch rights represent a management 
system in which fishermen would receive 
transferable certificates, with each cer­
tificate conferring the right to catch and 
sell a small, fixed proportion of the total 
"The inability to distribute licenses by auction would 
eliminate a potentially large source ofrevenues with 
which to fund a buy-back program. 
allowable catch. The total allowable 
catch would be determined each year by 
the management council. An alternative 
formulation would define each certificate 
as the right to catch a relatively small, 
fixed amount offish. Ineithercase, each 
fisherman's quota could consist ofa few 
or many certificates to accommodate dif­
ferences in scales of operation. Annual 
revisions ofthe estimated total allowable 
catch (TAC) would offer direct control 
over each season's total catch. Ifcertifi­
cates were expressed as a fixed percent­
age of the TAC, then each fisherman's 
quota would be automatically revised 
whenever a new TAC was announced. If 
certificates were expressed in pounds, 
then the government could either issue 
additional certificates whenever TAC 
was increased or buy certificates 
whenever TAC was reduced lO . More 
detailed discussions are found in Clark 
and Duncan (1986), Clark et al. (1988), 
Copes (1986), Crutchfield (1979), Geen 
and Nayar (1988), Moloney and Pearse 
(1979), Peacock and MacFarlane (1986) , 
Pearse (1980), and Robinson (1986). 
The use of catch rights as a manage­
ment system is similar to license limita­
tion in that both systems would create 
marketable fishing rights or privileges. 
License limitation would confer the right 
to deploy fishing effort, but each fisher­
man's catch would be unrestricted. This 
would lead to capital stuffing as fisher­
men compete to maintain or increase their 
shares ofthe overall catch. Catch rights 
would represent a more complete system 
of fishing rights: The right to deploy ef­
fort and catch a particularquantity offish. 
Catch rights would restrict access to the 
fishery only in that fishermen without 
certificates could not fish. But catch 
rights would not reduce the number of 
participants to a predetermined level as 
with license limitation. The fishery could 
have any number of fishermen with 
small, medium, or large vessels, pro­
10 The inability to auction or sell catch rights for more 
than the cost of issuing them would limit the ability 
ofthe government to generate the revenues required 
to buy catch rights whenever the TAC was reduced. 
Therefore, in practice, it may be preferable to defme 
catch rights as a percentage of TAC. This would 
eliminate the need for a large budget to reduce the 
number ofoutstanding catch rights, but it would add 
another element ofuncertainty about the magnitude 
of each fisherman's catch. 
vided that they own or lease certificates. 
Nevertheless, the number of active par­
ticipants in the fishery would be expected 
to decline because the total allowable 
catch (summed over all catch rights) 
would be less than what would be caught 
without catch rights as a means of re­
building depleted fish stocks. 
Economic Effects 
Catch rights would offer advantages to 
fishermen by enabling them to plan in­
vestment and harvesting strategies more 
efficiently. Catch rights would eliminate 
much ofthe uncertainty aboutthemagni­
tude of each fisherman's catch It. In 
essence, a known portion ofthe fish stock 
would be reserved for each fisherman 
with catch rights. Therefore, fishermen 
would not be compelled to invest in extra 
fishing power (capital stuffing) to com­
pete for fish on a first-come-first-served 
basis. They could invest in the fishing 
power required to minimize rather than 
maximize the cost of harvesting a given 
quantity offish. In addition, with trans­
ferable catch rights of relatively small 
denominations, the investment in catch 
rights would not necessarily be pro­
hibitive for fishermen with small vessels, 
part-time fishermen, and fishermen who 
participate in several fisheries throughout 
the year. Another advantage is that the 
harvesting season could last longer with 
catch rights, thereby avoiding temporary 
market gluts which could reduce fish 
prices and quality. For example, fishing 
seasons could last longer because 
fishermen would be less likely to fish in 
poor weather, or they could postpone part 
of their catches to take advantage of 
higher prices later in the season. Never­
theless, most fishing would probably still 
occur when fish are most abundant to 
minimize the costs oflocating and catch­
ing fish. 
But what is to prevent fishermen from 
making additional trips and illegally land­
ing fish in excess oftheir quotas? Catch 
rights will not work unless each fisher­
11 Some uncertainty about future catches would re­
main because the management agency could adjust 
the number ofcertificates outstanding (ifcertificates 
were expressed in pounds) or the numberofpounds 
per certificate (ifexpressed as a percentage oftotal 
allowable catch) in response to annual variability 
in stock size. 
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man's quota of fish is really there when 
he wants it. Therefore, the government 
must enforce the rules so that fishermen 
have a reasonable expectation of being 
caught and convicted if they attempt to 
land more than their quotas. And there 
must be a relatively severe schedule of 
penalties for cheating, such as loss of 
catch, fines, and temporary or permanent 
revocation of fishing privileges. If 
enough fishermen are known to cheat, 
then others would be compelled to cheat 
also orelse risk losing their shares of the 
overall catch. Dealers who buy illegally 
landed fish would also be subject to 
penalties. Ifgovernment cannot enforce 
the rules, then the system has no chance 
of success. The implication is that sub­
stantial enforcement costs may be re­
quired to achieve adequate compliance. 
Enforcement could be accomplished at 
dockside and could be costly because 
many individual quotas landed at many 
different ports would have to be moni­
tored. Fishermen could underreport 
landings by failing to report the correct 
quantities, by landing fish surreptitious­
ly at secret or existing landing sites, or by 
incorrect identification of species. 
Regulated red snappers might be reported 
as unregulated vermilion snappers, for 
example. Enforcement becomes more 
difficult as the numbers of fishermen, 
landing sites, and regulated species in­
creases (Copes, 1986). 
The Mid-Atlantic Fishery Manage­
ment Council facilitated dockside en­
forcement for surfclams and ocean qua­
hogs by issuing cage tags each year to 
fishermen in proportion to their individ­
ual quotas (U.S. Department of Com­
merce, 1990). Tags must be affixed to 
cages of surf clams and ocean quahogs 
before the cages leave the vessel and 
must be removed when cages are emptied 
at the final processing site. Anyone in 
possession offilled cages without a tag or 
empty cages with a tag is in violation of 
the management plan. Fishermen, 
dealers, and processors must report 
(among other things) tag numbers of 
cages that they handled. New Zealand 
implemented a double-entry data collec­
tion system to supplement dockside en­
forcement in its restricted-access 
fisheries (Muse and Schelle, 1988). Both 
the fisherman and buyer must file 
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separate records of each off-loading. 
Computer analysts then check to deter­
mine that the records match and that each 
fisherman's quota has notbeenexceeded. 
Ifgovernment demonstrates that it can 
successfully enforce the rules, then fish­
ermen will recognize that catch rights 
truly represent a limit on the ability to land 
and sell fish. More important, fishermen 
will then be willing to pay for catch rights 
to expand their scales of operation, to 
enter the fishery, or to adjust their hold­
ings of catch rights to match their actual 
annual catches. The value per catch right 
would be determined in the market for 
catch rights by the capitalized value ofad­
ditional profits expected to be earned over 
time with an extra certificate. Events, 
such as a higher ex-vessel price, that 
would increase the profitability offishing 
would cause an increase in the price per 
certificate. Conversely, such events as an 
increase in fuel prices which would 
decrease the profitability of fishing, 
would cause a decrease in the price per 
certificate. Fishermen would incur an 
additional variable cost equal to the mar­
ket value of their catch rights if they 
leased catch rights or an opportunity cost 
ifthey owned catch rights. Fishery rent 
would accrue to owners of catch rights 
rather than be dissipated among a larger 
number offishermen as in an open-access 
fishery. 
An adequate level of enforcement 
would create incentives for fishermen to 
conserve fish for the future and to report 
others who are known to violate the rules. 
Once fishermen have a substantial invest­
ment in catch rights, then it becomes to 
their advantage to protect their invest­
ments by voluntarily reporting those who 
attempt to cheat 12. Widespread cheating 
12 In contrast, open-access regulatory methods 
generally do not foster self-enforcement for 
economic reasons, although a majority of fishermen 
may comply for moral reasons. With open-access 
regulations, the temptation to cheat would always 
exist except for the penalties that could be levied if 
a fisherman were caught and convicted in violation 
of the rules. Severe penalties and/or a high prob­
ability of detection and conviction may prevent 
fishermen from cheating. Relatively small penalties 
and a low probability of detection and conviction 
would encourage fishermen to cheal. And individ­
uals have no incentive to voluntarily obey the rules 
if others are known to violate them with impunity 
because fish conserved by one fisherman would like­
ly be harvested by another. The alternative to con­
tinuous enforcement would be widespread cheating, 
which would thwart the intent of the regulations. 
would reduce, and eventually eliminate, 
the market value of catch rights: Fish­
ermen would not be willing to pay for 
something that they could obtain for free 
simply by cheating with impunity 
(Peacock and MacFarlane, 1986). 
When a system of catch rights is ini­
tiated, a formula would have to be estab­
lished to determine who would be in­
cluded in the program and how many 
certificates each person would receive. 
The initial allocation ofcatch rights must 
be considered by fishermen to be equi­
table. The opportunity for the initial re­
cipients ofcatch rights to gain a windfall 
ofwealth suggests that negotiations about 
criteria to qualify for an initial distribu­
tion of catch rights probably will be ar­
duous and contentious. Certificates could 
be distributed initially in a variety of 
ways. Most likely they would be given 
away based on criteria such as each 
fisherman's historical landings , invest­
ment, or experience in the fishery over 
some recent period l3 . As with license 
limitation, fishing effort would increase 
during the planning stages as fishermen 
compete to qualify for an initial distribu­
tion ofcatch rights. Catch rights could be 
issued seasonally, annually, in perpetu­
ity, or any other convenient term. Longer 
terms would lower the costs ofadminis­
tration and provide more stability for 
investment (in vessel, gear, and career 
choice) purposes. 
As a means of rebuilding the fish pop­
ulation, each fisherman would probably 
receive certificates to catch fewer fish 
than he historically had caught. Trans­
ferability of certificates would allow a 
market to develop in which certificates 
would be redistributed to better match 
desired levels of production. The most 
profitable fishermen would increase their 
quotas by buying or leasing catch rights 
from the least profitable fishermen, who 
would then probably switch to other 
fisheries. By selling their catch rights, 
fishermen who leave the fishery would at 
least receive some financial compensa­
tion for leaving. From an economic per­
spective, the redistribution ofcatch rights 
to the most profitable fishermen would 
J3 Catch rights could also be auctioned, but the 
Magnuson Actcurrently does not permit fees inex­
cess of administrative costs. 
7 
improve economic efficiency; fish would 
be landed at minimum cost. However, it 
could also lead to additional inefficiencies 
in other fisheries if access to them is not 
controlled. 
Transferable catch rights offer addi­
tional consequences. First, transferabil­
ity gives fishermen the flexibility to 
match their holdings of catch rights to 
their desired scales of operation, which 
may vary due to differences in boat size 
or a desire to participate in other fisheries 
during the year. Second, without trans­
ferability, fishermen would be unlikely 
to match exactly annual catches with their 
holdings ofcatch rights. Fishermencould 
end the season with unused catch rights. 
Or, fish would be discarded if actual 
catches exceeded holdings of catch 
rights. Third, transferable catch rights 
facilitate entry into a fishery with con­
trolled access. Fishermen could enter the 
fishery at a low level with a relatively 
small initial investment in catch rights. 
Then they could gradually increase their 
holdings of catch rights as they gain ex­
perience in the fishery and their financial 
position improves. Fourth, in addition to 
fishermen, other people associated with 
the fishery may wish to participate in the 
market for catch rights. For example, 
dealers and processors may wish to pur­
chase catch rights to ensure an adequate 
and timely supply offish. Vessels could 
be hired and dispatched to the fishing 
grounds as needed to fill sales orders, 
processing, and storage capacity. 
Other Considerations 
Multispecies fisheries present obsta­
cles for the successful use ofcatch rights. 
Total allowable catches would need to be 
specified and catch rights would need to 
be issued in one form or another for all 
major species or species groups in the 
fishery. Catch rights issued for fish in 
general, regardless of species, may not 
offer adequate protection for severely 
depleted species. On the other hand, 
catch rights issued for each species would 
cause problems for fishermen who need 
to match their multispecies catches to 
many quotas and would increase moni­
toring and enforcement costs. An appro­
priate compromise may be to issue catch 
rights for species groups which are gen­
erally caught together and which exhibit 
similar biological characteristics. 
In addition, the potential exists for an 
increased volume of discarded fish. 
Catch rights could lead to "high-grad­
ing" in which fishermen sort and discard 
the lowest valued fish so as not to exceed 
their individual quotas for a given spe­
cies. Also, after their individual quotas 
for one species or species group has been 
reached, fishermen could continue to fish 
for other species and discard their addi­
tional catches of the species for which 
quotas had already been filled. The prac­
tice ofdiscarding makes the choice ofap­
propriate total allowable catches, which 
must account for total extractions (dis­
cards plus landings) from the wild fish 
populations, more difficult. Copes 
(1986) offers a more detailed discussion 
ofthe potential problems with catch rights 
as a management technique. 
Summary and Discussion 
Traditional, open-access methods of 
regulation in a fishery will not significant­
1y improve the economic performance of 
fishermen. In the short term, fishermen 
will be forced to use less productive 
and/or more costly methods ofproduc­
tion. In the long term, the potential bio­
logical and economic benefits of regula­
tion will not be sustained because access 
to the fishery would remain unrestricted. 
Temporary biological improvements in 
fishery resources will encourage new 
fishermen to enter the fishery and existing 
fishermen to increase their effort. Even 
if traditional regulations proved ineffec­
tive and biological improvements were 
not forthcoming, fishing effort could 
increase over time due to cost-saving 
technological change and increases in the 
demand for commercial fishery products 
and recreational fishing activities. In­
creases in fishing effort will tend to 
minimize potential long-term economic 
and biological benefits of regulation. 
New regulations will have to be imple­
mented to further reduce fishing mortal­
ity by closing loopholes, restricting other 
gears or components of effort, or pro­
hibiting new innovations. The result of 
management with unrestricted access to 
the fishery will be additional and more 
costly and complex regulations as com­
petition increases for dwindling fishery 
resources. 
Limited-entry systems ofmanagement 
would restrict access to a fishery through 
the issuance ofa limited number of fish­
ing rights or privileges. These fishing 
rights would acquire a value which would 
accrue to their owners as an additional 
benefit from fishing. The market price of 
fishing rights would also increase the cost 
of participation in a fishery as an incen­
tive for the least efficient fishermen to 
shift to other fisheries or land-based 
employment opportunities. This would 
likely improve economic performance in 
the restricted fishery, but it could also 
lead to additional inefficiencies in other 
fisheries if access to them is not con­
trolled. Greater regulation in alternative 
fisheries may be necessary if the addi­
tional fishing effort leads to overfishing 
ofthe alternative species or hastened their 
decline if they were already overfished. 
License limitationand catch rights are 
the most common methods ofrestricting 
access to a fishery. With license limita­
tion, qualifying fishermen would receive 
a license for the right to fish, but each 
fisherman's allowable catch would be 
unrestricted. Among otherthings, Town­
send (1990) concluded that license limita­
tion slows the race for fish on a first­
come-first-served basis only in that there 
would be fewer fishermen. Hence, 
license limitation does not contribute to 
biological conservation of fish stocks. 
The quotas often accompanying limited 
entry offer biological conservation while 
license limitation offers economic bene­
fits by reducing short-term crowding 
externalities. 
Catch rights, when adequately en­
forced, have the potential to change 
fishing strategies. Ideally, catch rights 
should have certain desirable character­
istics to facilitate attainment ofeconomic 
efficiency and biological conservation. 
Thecatch right must be recognized by the 
judicial system as a legitimate and ex­
clusive right of participation in the 
fishery, and it should be permanent so that 
fishermen individually and collectively 
believe that they have a vested interest in 
the continued well-being of the fishery 
resource. In addition, government must 
demonstrate that it can prevent fishermen 
from illegally landing fish in excess of 
their quotas. If these conditions are 
satisfied, then fishermen will have an 
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incentive to cooperate in the use of con­
servative harvesting strategies, including 
peer pressure to discourage noncompli­
ance with fishery regulations and/or ac­
ceptable fishing practices (Scott, 1988). 
In this sense, the existence ofcatch rights 
would facilitate individual control over 
fishing effort as a substitute for some, but 
not necessarily all, direct government 
restrictions on fishing times, locations, 
gear types, and keep rates. Fishingeffort 
would be limited, but fishermen would 
retain more flexibility in their choices of 
when, where, and how to fish, including 
the ability to fully utilize existing capital 
before replacing it. Catch rights could be 
complemented with traditional methods 
of regulation in specific circumstances. 
For example, minimum size limits could 
reduce catches of juvenile fish, and 
seasonal and area closures could reduce 
catches of spawning fish. However, the 
retention of open-access methods of 
regulation would also retain their nega­
tive qualities, with perhaps only the scale 
of their problems changed. It would be 
better to eliminate or simplify as many 
traditional regulations as possible rather 
than to add catch rights to a host of ex­
isting open-access regulations. 
Why are traditional methods ofregula­
tion adopted ifthey are ineffective in the 
long term? For one thing, they offer at 
least temporary biological protection. 
Also, these types ofregulations, especial­
ly gear restrictions and minimum income 
requirements, have tended to benefit 
politically dominant groups offishermen 
by allocating a relatively larger share of 
the overall catch to their members (Kar­
poff, 1987). In this sense, traditional 
regulations minimize social and political 
discord due to regulation and hence may 
elicit relatively high voluntary com­
pliance and may be relatively inexpensive 
to enforce. 
Open-access regulations may be pre­
ferred over limited entry for philosoph­
ical reasons in what Acheson (1980) 
called the" Adam Smith response. " The 
number of fishermen in a fishery is self 
regulated by competition. Limited entry 
may be perceived as an additional re­
straint on the free enterprise system in 
which a select few would be protected 
from normal competitive forces. 
Economists counter with two argu­
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ments. First, because fish are common 
property, the unregulated free enterprise 
system does not result in optimal levels 
offishing effort and overall harvest from 
the perspective ofsociety as a whole. As 
Hardin (1968) wrote, "Freedom in a 
commons brings ruin to all." Open­
access regulations allow as much free­
dom ofaccess as possible while restrict­
ing how, when, and where people fish. 
Limited-entry regulations restrict access 
while allowing as much freedom as pos­
sible to choose how, when, and where to 
fish. Many fishermen and fishery man­
agers may simply prefer to maintain the 
historical tradition of open access to 
marine fisheries. Second, limited entry 
would not protect individuals from com­
petition for the limited number offishing 
privileges as long as licenses or catch 
rights are transferable. 
The prospect of a market-based dis­
tribution offishing privilegesmay evoke 
additional opinions about limited entry. 
Many fishermen and fishery managers 
may oppose the potential redistributional 
effects oflimited entry (Acheson, 1980). 
Open-access regulations allocate fish 
among fishermen on a first-come-first­
served basis subject to certain restrictions 
described by the regulations. With 
limited entry, on the other hand, after the 
initial distribution of fishing rights, ac­
cess to the fishery would be determined 
by market forces. Newcomers could buy 
or rent fishing rights to enter the fishery, 
and retirees would be paid to leave. But 
the final distribution of fishing rights 
among small-scale fishermen, large­
scale fishermen, processors, and other 
investors would be different from open 
access and may be viewed as less predic­
table or less desirable than that oftradi­
tional regulations. Some fishermen may 
fear that they would receive an unfair 
initial distribution of fishing rights, that 
they may be excluded from the fishery 
altogether, or that ownership of fishing 
privileges would soon be purchased by 
wealthier fishermen and corporations. 
And excess capital and labor may not be 
easily transferred to other fisheries or 
land-based employment, which would 
create large short-term losses for those 
who were excluded. 
Fishery managers may prefer open­
access regulations if there is a large rec­
reational fishery for which access cannot 
be easily controlled. Limited-entry pro­
grams are generally applied to commer­
cial fisheries and traditional methods of 
regulation (e.g., bag limits and annual 
quotas) to the recreational sector. But 
without geographical separation of the 
fish stocks sought by commercial and 
recreational fishermen, open-access 
competition by the recreational sector 
would undermine the potential benefits of 
limited entry for the commercial sector. 
It is not clear how limited entry could 
be applied to recreational fishermen. One 
option would be a separate limited-entry 
system of licenses or catch rights for 
recreational fishermen. A management 
system based on catch rights could in­
clude recreational fishermen more easily 
than could a system based on license 
limitation. Recreational fishermen could 
receive initial allocations ofcatch rights, 
probably by lottery because historical 
levels of participation in the fishery are 
difficult to verify. Then they could par­
ticipate in the market for catch rights to 
increase or decrease their holdings of 
catch rights. Fishing tackle shops and 
marinas may wish to purchase catch 
rights for resale to recreational fishermen 
while charter and party boat operators 
may purchase catch rights for their 
clients. If recreational and commercial 
fishermen competed in the same market 
for catch rights, then the allocation ofthe 
total allowable catch between the recrea­
tional and commercial sectors would be 
determined in the market for catch rights 
rather than by tradition or political clout. 
By definition, fish would be allocated to 
their most highly valued uses because 
catch rights would be purchased by those 
most willing and able to pay for them. 
Nevertheless, ifcompliance is poor then 
enforcement would be costly because of 
the large numbers offishermen and points 
of landing. Whatever methods are 
chosen, however, ifrecreational fishing 
effort is not restricted, then the potential 
biological and economic benefits of 
reducing commercial fishing effort 
would be minimized by long-term in­
creases in recreational effort. 
Finally, fishery managers and fisher­
men may hesitate to forego familiar open­
access methods of management if they 
sense that economists, in their zeal, have 
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overstated the potential advantages of 
restricting access to a fishery and over­
looked some ofthe disadvantages. In fact, 
early advocates of license limitation 
underestimated the ability of fishermen 
to expand their use ofuncontrolled com­
ponents ofeffort. Various licenselimita­
tion programs have existed for many 
years and their advantages and shortcom­
ings are now well documented (Town­
send, 1990). In theory, the use of catch 
rights is superior to license limitation. 
However, management programs with 
catch rights are relatively new, and hence 
their effects in practice have not been as 
thoroughly scrutinized. Copes (1986) 
provides a discussion of potential prob­
lems in the implementation of catch 
rights. 
Turvey (1964) noted that' '(A) fishery 
is one ofthose spheres ofeconomic policy 
where what is the best thing to do depends 
on what can be done." Nevertheless, 
given the long-term' disadvantages of 
traditional, open-access methods of 
managing marine fisheries, it makes 
sense to explore the possibilities ofalter­
native methods of regulating fishing ef­
fort. An empirical question is whether or 
not the potential benefits would exceed 
the costs ofstarting, monitoring, and en­
forcing a limited-entry system of 
management. 
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